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Henning Riecke and Simon Koschut | Bucharest was initially dubbed the “en-
largement summit.” But this epithet was soon obsolete, despite the go-ahead 
for Albania and Croatia to join. Western European opposition to Ukrainian 
and Georgian membership plans was too strong. Would enlargement neces-
sarily increase NATO’s capacity?
NATO’s Global Aspirations 
The dispute over enlargement reflects uncertainties about NATO’s function
The summit in Romania was designed to increase NATO’s capacity for inter-
national action through the addition of new members and partners. But the 
admission of new members—for years an important means of creating stability 
in Europe itself—is just one strategy toward this end. Another point of debate 
in the run-up to Bucharest was the US initiative to enhance the partner status 
of states taking part in NATO operations. A third approach is the partnership 
programs that support reforms and stability in regions in which NATO is ac-
tive. Finally, NATO is expanding relations with both the United Nations and 
regional organizations. 
These measures have been spurred by different motives, and they serve pri-
marily to protect and support democratic reform processes. However, in order 
to gain majority support and become permanent fixtures of NATO strategy, 
they must be aligned with the alliance’s overarching goal of increasing its capac-
ity for action in the international arena. Of central importance is the integra-
tion of states and organizations that themselves contribute resources and capa-
bilities. NATO enlargement has implications for the future of these states—im-
plications that do not please all NATO members. Initiatives that could actually 
strengthen NATO meet with opposition from members trying to avoid undesir-
able political consequences. 
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Only Two New Members
The planned enlargement of the alliance led to visible tensions in Bucharest. 
Thanks to President Bush, an issue that initially seemed only mildly controver-
sial was moved to the top of the summit agenda. The United States and Great 
Britain want to integrate new states into NATO in an effort to expand Western 
influence and create stability, and they are supported in this endeavor by the 
alliance members from East Central Europe. Part of their motivation is to assist 
troubled states in the democratic transformation process and to provide West-
ern protection against an increasingly aggressive Russia. 
The Bucharest agenda included Membership Action Plans 
(MAPs) for Ukraine and Georgia and invitations to states in 
the Western Balkans to join NATO.
Weeks before the summit convened in Bucharest, it was 
clear that Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania would be offered 
membership. Like virtually every country in NATO, Ger-
many supports the admission of Balkan states in the context of a stabilization 
strategy for the region. But Macedonia and Albania remain problematic: aside 
from economic issues, corruption and organized crime, as well as the slow in-
troduction of constitutional structures, are matters of concern in both coun-
tries. Croatia and Albania received promises of membership in Bucharest. The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was unable to resolve a 
dispute over its name with its southern neighbor, Greece. The government in 
Athens rests on a weak legislative minority that would not have survived a 
Greek loss of face at the summit. This is why NATO showed solidarity with 
Athens and supported the Greek position and no offer of membership was 
made to Skopje.
Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine are also pushing to join the alliance 
with American support. Both countries are involved in numerous NATO op-
erations and they hoped to finalize MAPs in Bucharest. NATO is currently 
engaged in intensive talks with Georgia as a kind of substitute process for the 
formal admission procedure. The Ukrainian government has strongly support-
ed rapprochement with NATO, and through the NATO-Ukraine Council the 
alliance is pursuing a special partnership with this former Soviet republic. Even 
so, Germany has taken a critical view of attempts to admit the two former 
Soviet republics, and it was eager to prevent the MAPs in Bucharest. Together 
with France, Germany led a strong NATO minority against admission and was 
able to prevail against the US-led majority at the summit. 
The critics cited serious reservations about the stability of the candidate 
countries and concerns about relations with Russia. Berlin fears that a MAP 
will worsen secession conflicts in Georgia. As for Ukraine, it is not certain that 
the majority of the population supports membership, which means it could 
only be pushed through at the cost of increased domestic tensions. What would 
the alliance do if, during the MAP phase, Russia retaliated bilaterally? Moscow 
could charge higher energy prizes or apply trade restrictions against the two 
countries, thus impeding reforms and development. The NATO admission pro-
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cess is often seen as the first step toward EU membership. This is only a minor 
problem for the Balkan states, to whom the European Union has in principle 
promised membership—but it worsens Georgia’s prospects. 
Numerous commentators accused the German government of using these 
reasons as a pretext, implying its real motive was the desire not to strain Rus-
sian relations. Indeed, Berlin sees no reason to provoke a 
conflict with Moscow. German Foreign Minister Frank-Wal-
ter Steinmeier was more explicit on this issue than was the 
chancellor. Before the Bucharest summit, Russia vigorously 
opposed NATO’s new eastern enlargement plans. The Ger-
man arguments—domestic coherence in Ukraine and crisis 
management in Georgia—are based on genuine stability concerns that are in 
line with German foreign policy priorities. They lose weight in the alliance, 
though, because they go alongside a policy toward Russia that some see as ap-
peasement.
Even though NATO did not offer MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine in Bucha-
rest, the final communiqué included an important phrase to appease the Amer-
icans: “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”1 
In reality, though, this statement has little value without a timetable. The meet-
ing of NATO foreign ministers in December 2008 can make a decision about 
the MAPs, but participants are unlikely to broach the issue since the Americans 
will be in the midst of a change in government. It is also uncertain whether the 
domestic conditions in Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia will have changed to such 
a degree by NATO’s anniversary summit in Strasbourg that Berlin and Paris 
will rethink the issue. 
Stagnating Regional Partnerships 
Expanding NATO’s capacity for international deployment is a central concern 
for all members, not only the Americans. Since the 1990s, NATO has used re-
gional partnership programs as a vehicle to win over partner states to collabo-
rate on missions. It is true that these programs primarily aim to encourage re-
gional cooperation and to institutionalize both information exchanges and dia-
logue, but network-building with potential allies in the operations is also a key 
motivation. Nevertheless, cooperation with countries in strategic neighboring 
regions has fallen short of expectations. 
One of these programs is the Partnership for Peace (PfP), established in 1994. 
PfP focuses on practical military and civilian cooperation, joint maneuvers, ex-
plosive ordinance disposal, and even participation in NATO-led peacekeeping 
missions. The program includes countries in Eastern Europe, neutral states in 
Western Europe, and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). Potential NATO membership has always been a strong incentive for coop-
eration, particularly among European partners. Regular consultations on security 
1) “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” April 3, 2008, No. 23, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/
p08-049e.html.
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policy issues in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) support the work 
of PfP. To its credit, the program has to a certain extent achieved its goal, as there 
is now a security environment in Europe that makes wars between states highly 
unlikely. Since the mid-1990s NATO has also been expanding regional coopera-
tion to include the Mediterranean region. The dialogue with seven states abutting 
the Mediterranean, including Israel and Egypt, complements the Mediterranean 
initiatives of the European Union and G-8. Furthermore, through the Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative, initiated in 2004, NATO has ex-
tended its cooperation with Arab and Muslim states to 
include the entire Middle East. This cooperation, which 
supplements the G-8’s Broader Middle East Initiative, cov-
ers such issues as security policy collaboration in the war 
against international terrorism, the non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and border controls aimed at restricting the illegal 
trade in drugs, weapons, and human beings. Through this third partnership ini-
tiative, NATO is promoting a deepened understanding of security in a strategi-
cally important region. 
There was little change in these partnership programs at the NATO summit 
in Bucharest. Malta announced that it would re-enter PfP after withdrawing in 
1996. NATO partners also declared their willingness to carry out a more inten-
sive dialogue with Serbia. Various projects to deepen PfP cooperation were in-
troduced and more frequent meetings were called for in the Mediterranean dia-
logue, but there was no dynamic progress in the work of ICI. Only four coun-
tries agreed to cooperate in 2006. In view of the complex security problems in 
the “crescent of crisis,” closer cooperation would be highly desirable for 
NATO.
On the one hand, these partnership strategies have been effective and suc-
cessful in strengthening NATO capabilities—as can be seen by the contribu-
tions made by non-members to the alliance’s peacekeeping missions in regions 
such as the Balkans. On the other hand, the cooperative potential of regional 
partnerships has yet to be fully exploited. This potential includes deeper in-
volvement of partner states in the operative decision-making processes of 
NATO, possibly in the framework of the EAPC. The partners could also be 
consulted more frequently on their experiences with energy security and other 
difficult issues. Moreover, the partnership approach could be extended into ad-
ditional strategic regions such as sub-Saharan Africa or Southeast Asia, provid-
ing the alliance with potential new partners and courses of action.  
Modest Offers to “Contact Countries” 
In 2004 Washington placed a new partnership concept on the NATO agenda: 
the “privileged partnership” project, which focuses on the integration of the 
democratic states that contribute to NATO operations. Ties are meant to be 
closer than in existing partnership programs. At the NATO summit in Riga in 
2006, participants approved a partnership concept that envisages stronger mili-
tary and political cooperation with so-called “contact countries,” which include 
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Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan. This cautious approach re-
flects the criticism of NATO members such as Germany that regards NATO’s 
transformation into a global “alliance of democracies” as problematic. Even so, 
the American vision lives on. Republican presidential candidate John McCain 
has repeatedly voiced his support for such an alliance, which could emerge from 
a globally expanded NATO.2
Of vital importance to the United States is NATO’s capacity for action. 
After all, partner states make a direct contribution to NATO-led operations and 
can thus claim the right to participate in NATO votes on these operations. Part-
ner states also need to expand resources and capabilities and build the political 
determination necessary for upcoming deployments. If they 
manage to do so, the United States will then be able to draw 
on them for US-led missions outside NATO’s structures. 
The fact that all these partners come from the greater Asia 
Pacific region caters to US security policy, which is geared 
toward engagement with China. Europeans fear that ex-
panded partnerships will give the United States greater opportunity to form 
coalitions with supportive states independent of any consensus in the alliance. 
The closer integration of contact countries into the alliance’s decision-making 
mechanisms was controversial in Bucharest. Awarding this sort of partnership 
status prior to membership would have consequences for NATO’s political coher-
ence. There are already conflicts within the alliance over the use of military force 
and NATO’s international role. Integrating additional democratic states with in-
dependent regional interests will hardly simplify joint action. For new partners, 
it is relations with the United States that make ties to NATO attractive. 
But the partners would also be able to demand political support from NATO 
states for risks that have little to do with the security of present members. 
While it is unlikely that NATO will broaden its collective support guarantee 
(Article V) to include these partners, they might press the alliance to become 
involved in crisis responses lying far beyond most members’ spheres of interest. 
Expansion into Asia also brings the threat of friction with China, which is 
likely to perceive NATO partnerships as part of an American containment 
policy. Expansion may thus come into conflict with the Europeans’ more eco-
nomically oriented policy toward China. 
Finally, one must consider the effects that a global NATO will have on the 
international order, which currently rests on the predominant role of the 
United Nations and the principle of the equality of states. A global NATO, born 
by established democracies always convinced they are in the right, could be 
tempted to use military means without a valid mandate under international 
law. Furthermore, states such as China and Russia that are declared non-demo-
cratic are likely to respond to the creation of a global democratic alliance by 
establishing counter alliances.
2) See John McCain’s remarks to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council (March 26, 2008), 
http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/News/Speeches/872473dd-9ccb-4ab4-9d0d-
ec54f0e7a497.htm.
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There is, however, consensus that cooperation with partners should be en-
hanced through regular consultations, and joint transformation programs and 
exercises. Participants in the Bucharest summit passed a number of “tailor-
made packages” for contact countries. These will increase the alliance’s capac-
ity for international action—even if they fall short of the American vision of 
“privileged” partners.  
Regional Organizations as New Partners?
In the area of global crisis management, NATO must find ways to ensure its 
influence without committing substantial numbers of troops. In this regard, 
NATO must not overlook the strategy of expanding relations with regional se-
curity organizations. The goal here would be to establish a network of security 
organizations that will increasingly assume responsibility for “customized” 
crisis management in their respective regions. Africa could be an initial focus, 
and similar structures are also conceivable in the Middle East and Central Asia. 
NATO would be at the heart of such a network.
The most important requirement is intensive collaboration not only between 
NATO headquarters and the office of the UN Secretary General, but also 
between the alliance and individual UN organizations. At the Bucharest sum-
mit, NATO once again confirmed its desire for closer coop-
eration with the United Nations, which was reflected in the 
participation of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. NATO 
is also prepared to campaign to have missions mandated 
under international law in the UN Security Council, using 
the weight, yet not the dominant position, of its democratic 
partners. The alliance would then be tasked with providing specific services to 
increase the effectiveness of its partner institutions. It could help build admin-
istrative capabilities through training, consulting, and financial support. It 
could also provide transport planes and ships to deploy troops to crisis regions. 
Communications and surveillance technology are among the other services it 
could offer to expand the operational capabilities of locally deployed troops. 
NATO could even offer its own human resources in theaters of operation if 
political support could be drummed up in the members’ home countries. One 
example is the deployment of forces to provide medical care in crisis regions.  
But present experiences are sobering. This type of partnership can be seen 
in the collaboration between NATO and the African Union (AU) during the 
AU’s mission in Sudan (AMIS). NATO not only provided aircraft to deploy 
troops but also trained personnel to enhance the AU’s capabilities on a strategic 
and operational level. Despite this support, AMIS was incapable of safeguard-
ing the population in Darfur and was eventually replaced by a UN mission. Yet 
this failure does not discredit NATO’s role.
An additional problem is that security organizations that have the necessary 
political coherence and that are able to develop the military planning skills es-
sential for involvement in crisis management do not always exist. In the 
ASEAN Regional Forum there is no military collaboration upon which new 
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crisis response capabilities can be based. The Gulf Cooperation Council only 
has a small joint military force. The military exercises of the Shanghai Organi-
zation are intended primarily as a show of force to the Western world. This 
starting point is a major challenge to the globalization of NATO. 
It is here that new partner states come into play once again. “Political go-
getters”—states that use their political weight to give organizations adequate 
powers—must act as political entrepreneurs in establishing these structures. 
NATO must select partner states on the basis of whether they can credibly play 
such a role. In addition to partners in Asia, NATO must be prepared to work 
with regional powers such as Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. 
Russia, though problematic, must also be included. The Western allies will need 
to rely more heavily on political, economic, and finical incentives to win over 
partners for this difficult task.
